

NFAC #041-82

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

5 January 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM :  Assistant National Intelligence Officer for USSR

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SUBJECT : Polish Situation, 5 January 1982

1. Paragraphs 2-4 of the attached cable summarize Ambassador Meehan's views of the Polish situation. In paragraphs 24 and 25 of the text the Ambassador turns to the effect of a tougher US policy and suggests that it may lead Jaruzelski to adopt an even more repressive policy and to become even more dependent on the Soviets.

2. Although I agree with the Ambassador's description of the current situation, I do not think that a tough US policy will be an important determinant of Jaruzelski's behavior. I believe that the imposition of martial law has already set in train internal dynamics which point to repression and increased dependence on the Soviets for at least the coming year. The only possibility of avoiding such a course would be for Jaruzelski to realize that he cannot recreate an economically viable Poland in the face of both passive resistance and tough Western economic policy.

3. Although we do not know the exact effect of Western sanctions on passive resistance, we do know, that the Polish man in the street has been gratified by the President's tough stance. By its combined effect on popular morale and on the economy then, the maintenance of a tough US line could make Jaruzelski realize that he has embarked on a no-win course and take a more conciliatory approach toward Solidarity and the Church. The chance of this happening is exceedingly small, particularly since the Soviets have now installed themselves at all levels of the Polish military and security hierarchies. Even if it fails to realize the most desirable objective -- a more pluralistic Poland -- a tough US policy will still have the benefit of increasing the cost of repression for the Soviets and the Polish regime -- both in financial terms and in the political uncertainties created by a population which looks to the West for more inspiration. At this point, in US terms, there is little hope for a positive outcome in Poland. There is still the possibility for making the securing of Poland even more costly than it already is for the Soviets.

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State Dept. review completed

Attachment

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